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Chapter 14
The Australian Retirement Income System:
Comparisons with and Lessons for the
United States
Rafal Chomik and John Piggott
Typical retirement income systems across the developed world comprise
multiple pillars with (1) some form of welfare poverty alleviation payment,
sometimes part of a non-age related welfare policy; (2) an unfunded, pay-
as-you-go, deﬁned beneﬁt (DB), earnings-related, income replacement
scheme, which requires contributions and a substantial vesting period; and
(3) income tax-preferred voluntary retirement saving, with the tax break
contingent on these savings being preserved to some speciﬁed access age.
While parametric settings vary widely, this basic structure is widely deployed,
and it is also being adopted by newly maturing economies such as Korea, or
emerging ones such as Thailand.
By contrast, the Australian structure comprises a non-contributory tax-
free1 pension payment available at a given age, generous enough to provide
a modest standard of living when combined with ownership of a dwelling,
and means-tested to exclude the afﬂuent; a mandatory tax-preferred
deﬁned contribution (DC) plan for employees, with substantial employer
contributions; and voluntary, tax-preferred (often workplace-based) con-
tributions.
This chapter provides a partial account of the design and operation of the
Australian retirement income system, with a view to emphasizing the lessons
for US institutions. To establish how the two countries are comparable we
begin with some relevant facts and ﬁgures about their economies and
demographics. We then describe Australian policy and practice, with special
emphasis on its two most important elements: the age pension and manda-
tory pre-funded superannuation. We also discuss the role and interpretation
of incentives in the Australian structure and suggest that this structure has
incentive effects which are less distortionary in a modern mixed economy
than a more conventional structure has. As an aside, we provide some
information about how public sector employee plans have evolved in this
environment.
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Australia and the US: Demography and Economy
Australia and the US are vastly different countries. Australia is a small, open
economy with a population of about 23 million people, slightly smaller than
Texas (Figure 14.1). The US population is 14 times larger. Adjusted for
purchasing power parity, Australia’s GDP was $1 trillion (USD) in 2012,
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Figure 14.1 Comparison of population, economy, and government budget
Source : OECD (2014); IMF (2014).
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just over 6 percent of the US ﬁgure. In 2012, net government debt stood at
12 percent of GDP in Australia; the US ﬁgure was 84 percent of GDP. The
Australian budget deﬁcit was about 3.5 percent of GDP, while the US
government budget deﬁcit was about 9.3 percent of GDP.
When we adjust for population size, the countries resemble each other
more closely. Average per capita income, adjusted for purchasing power
parity, is slightly higher in the US but of the same order, at approximately
$52,000 (USD), compared to Australia’s $44,000. Median incomes are also
slightly higher in the US, as is income inequality (Figure 14.2).
In spite of these differences, the fundamentals relevant to retirement
provision are reasonably similar. Australia and the US have similar age
structures (Figure 4.3). On average, Australians live longer and have fewer
children than Americans, but higher migration rates and gentler fertility
declines mean Australia’s current and projected age structure is similar to
that of the US.
The Australian Retirement Income System Structure
A much-used framework for retirement provision posits three ‘pillars’ of old
age support.2 The ﬁrst pillar operates as a non-contributory transfer pro-
gram, which means it can pay beneﬁts to all.3 The second pillar offers
payments related to pre-retirement labor income, on some mandatory
basis—typically, some proportion of wages or salary, paid either by
employer, employee, or both. The third pillar comprises voluntary retire-
ment saving. This structure is depicted in Figure 14.4, in which the Austra-
lian and US structures are highlighted.4
The age pension
The mainstay of Australian government retirement provision is the age
pension, ﬁrst introduced in 1909. This ﬂat rate beneﬁt is potentially
available to all, regardless of work history, subject to access age and resi-
dency requirements. It operates as a means-tested support payment. It is
not tested to target the destitute but rather to exclude the afﬂuent. Almost
80 percent of the age-eligible population receive some age pension pay-
ment, and 50 percent receive a full age pension, in sharp contrast to the US
means-tested programs (see the later section on Comparative Retirement
Outcomes).
Means test withdrawal rates, based on both income and asset tests, were
incorporated into the age pension at its inception. Since the late 1960s, they
have undergone repeated modiﬁcation and reform. The means tests are
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/12/2015, SPi
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comprehensively deﬁned, although the asset test excludes owner-occupied
housing.5
Currently, the income taper rate (or beneﬁt reduction rate) is set at 50
percent for income over a certain threshold. The asset taper reduces the age
pension amount by $1.50 (AUD) per fortnight, for every $1,000 over a
threshold that differs by family status and homeownership.
The age pension is ﬁnanced from general revenue and (including a
related disability pension) costs approximately 3.6 percent of GDP (see
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section on Comparative Retirement Outcomes). A full age pension beneﬁt
is equivalent to 27.7 percent of male average full-time earnings for single
pensioners and 41.3 percent for couples. Net replacement rates (the com-
parison of net income before and after retirement) are relatively high
because no income tax is payable on the age pension.6
This beneﬁt level is indexed to the greater of the increase in male average
earnings, the consumer price index (CPI), and a pension and beneﬁciary
living cost index (PBI).7 As a result, the age pension keeps up with wages in
the rest of the economy, and by implication with standards of living. The
eligibility age is currently 65 but will increase to age 67 between 2017 and
2023 (Commonwealth of Australia 2009).8
Compulsory saving: the Superannuation Guarantee
Australia also mandates signiﬁcant employer contributions to DC pension
funds, known as Superannuation Funds. This ‘Superannuation Guarantee’
corresponds to government-based income replacement policies such as
US Social Security. While tax-preferred, it does not generate government
liabilities.
In essence, the Superannuation Guarantee guarantees only that the
employer will contribute 9.25 percent of wages to a superannuation fund
of the employee’s choice; this rate is set to rise to 12 percent over the next
several years. Fees and a fund tax are payable on these contributions, so the
net contribution to the account is probably closer to 7 percent, increasing to
a little less than 10 percent. Some 90 percent of Australian employees are
now covered by the superannuation system, about double the level of
coverage seen at the time mandatory arrangements were introduced in
the late 1980s (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1999, 2011b).
Employeesmay choose to have the contributions deposited into an account
with a range of investment options, managed by any open fund, although
‘choice of fund’ is not much exercised. All DC funds offer an investment
menu and all must nominate a low-management-cost default, known as
MySuper (which may be age-based), for those (the large majority) who do
not actively engage with their superannuation fund.Many people have also set
up and self-manage their own superannuation funds, whichmust comply with
various reporting and auditing requirements overseen by the tax authority.
Beneﬁts from superannuation savings can be accessed as early as age 55, the
statutory preservation age, which is rising to 60 for those born after June 1964.
The form of retirement beneﬁts is not mandated, and these are often taken as
lump sums, although there has been a recent trend toward phased withdrawal
type income streams (account-based pensions or annuities). At present, very
few lifetime annuities are purchased (Bateman and Piggott 2011b).
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The lack of policy structure around drawdowns is seen by many as a major
ﬂaw in the Australian policy. The Australian Treasury estimated that a fully
mature superannuation guarantee after 40 years’ contributions, alongwith the
means-tested age pension, can be expected to deliver a retirement replace-
ment rate of around 90 percent for a worker with median male earnings and
78 percent for a worker with average weekly earnings (Gallagher 2011; see
section 4 for OECD analysis and US comparisons). But for these outcomes to
be realized, retirement income products must be purchased. In practice, the
annuity market is very thin, the product range is limited, and there is little in
thewayof regulatory structure to support its development. In addition, average
accumulation balances at retirement are currently relatively small, around
$100,000 (AUD) for women and $200,000 for men in 2011–12 (Clare 2014).9
How the Superannuation Guarantee was introduced
A brief history of the Superannuation Guarantee may be of interest from a
political economy perspective.10 Until the 1990s, Australians relied mainly
on the age pension for retirement income provision. Tax breaks for volun-
tary superannuation (the third pillar) were introduced in 1915 and subse-
quently strengthened in 1936. Nevertheless, preservation and coverage were
low. By the mid-1980s, only about one-third of workers in the private sector
and fewer than half of all workers were covered by superannuation.
Unlike many other OECD countries, a government-provided earnings- or
employment-related retirement income scheme has never been introduced
in Australia, despite several attempts to do so. Draft legislation for such a
plan was developed in 1939, but the outbreak of war meant that it was never
introduced into Parliament. In the 1970s, a government-commissioned
report recommended a more or less standard social security plan, but a
change of government in 1975 meant the report was never acted upon.
In the early 1980s, an era when centralized wage ﬁxing still existed in
Australia, a Labor government found itself committed to maintaining real
wages in the face of an economy with signiﬁcant excess demand and the
threat of a wage-price spiral. This was resolved by granting an increase equal
to the inﬂation rate of 6 percent, with half being put into industry-based
superannuation funds. Following the introduction of ‘Productivity Award
Superannuation,’ coverage increased markedly. This was particularly true
for workers in private sector industries dominated by women, and for casual
and part-time workers, such as in the retail industry, where coverage
increased from 24 percent in 1986 to 82 percent in 1993 (Australian
Bureau of Statistics 1999, 2011a, 2011b).
But a contribution system built into the national wage award structure,
which was itself being dismantled, was costly and difﬁcult to enforce. In
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1991, an attempt supported by government and the unions to increase
contributions by a further 3 percent was rejected by the Australian industrial
court. The government response was to introduce legislation that would
enshrine what is now known as the Superannuation Guarantee. Starting in
1992, it required employers to make contributions on behalf of their
employees into an approved superannuation fund, with contribution rates
phased to increase to 9 percent by 2002. In 2012 the government initiated a
phased increase in the mandatory contribution rate to 12 percent.
Voluntary retirement saving
The ﬁrst and second pillars of Australia’s retirement income system are
supplemented by voluntary long-term savings that include superannuation,
property, shares, managed investments, and homeownership. The last is the
most important non-superannuation asset for most Australians: net equity in
home ownership in 2009/10 was worth 40 percent of household wealth and
over 80 percent of retirees are owner-occupiers (mostly with no mortgage)
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011a).
Voluntary contributions fall under the same policy structures as manda-
tory contributions. Voluntary contributions from employees or employers
result in about one-third of superannuation fund members enjoying contri-
bution rates of over 9 percent of earnings (Australian Bureau of Statistics
2009).
Structure and function of the superannuation industry
The superannuation industry comprises a range of fund categories, ranging
from public sector employee funds through ‘industry’ funds, institutionally
close to the union movement, corporate and retail funds, and self-managed
superannuation funds (SMSFs). Except for SMSFs, superannuation funds
are managed by a board of trustees. Their operations are overseen by the
Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) which provides pruden-
tial oversight for banks, insurance companies, and superannuation funds.
Overall, administration costs and charges have tended to be slightly
higher than in the US. This may be because of more complex taxation
and other arrangements which have been ‘grandfathered’ with policy
change. High fees may also reﬂect a lack of competition, given, for example,
that the mandatory contributions are made not ‘into the account’ but ‘from
the employer,’ which generates less cost competition to service providers.
On latest available ﬁgures, average overall fees are about 0.97 percent of
managed assets (Cooper 2010) compared to 0.93 percent in the US
(Deloitte 2009).
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Comparative Retirement Outcomes
The structure and parameters of a retirement income system are inﬂuential
for retirement outcomes for individuals and government budgets, even if
causality is difﬁcult to tease out. In the following, we look at the proﬁle of
older people in Australia and the US in relation to poverty alleviation and
income replacement from pensions and other sources.
As noted above, Australia’s ﬁrst pillar is more prominent than in other
countries, and certainly in comparison to the US. While 78 percent of the
Australian population age 65 and over relies on the targeted age pension, in
the US only 7 percent are eligible to receive old age Supplemental Security
Income (SSI; Figure 14.5A). The value of the Australian age pension is also
higher: approximately 29 percent of average earnings, compared to 18
percent for the US SSI (Figure 14.5B). Pension eligibility and generosity
arrangements are reﬂected in elderly poverty rates. Based on a poverty line
at 40 percent of the population-wide median income,11 poverty rates in
Australia are signiﬁcantly lower than in the US—around 5 percent of people
aged 65 and older are below the poverty threshold, less than half of the US
rate (Figure 14.5C).
Comparing income replacement outcomes is also instructive. While Aus-
tralian and US workers with average earnings are estimated to pay similar
taxes and Social Security contributions, taxes are higher for US pensioners
(Figure 14.6A, which shows income tax and social contributions rates for
average workers compared with non-working pensioners with pension
amounts at the two different levels).
Most of the older US population relies on Social Security for income.
Coverage for private pension schemes is about half of the rates seen in
Australia where membership is compulsory (Figure 14.6B). So future net
replacement rates may be lower for US pensioners. Using mandatory
schemes only, the OECD (2013) calculates net replacement rates for hypo-
thetical full-career workers with average earnings to be 68 percent in
Australia and 47 percent for those in the US. Replacement rates for those
on low incomes are higher, but muchmore so in Australia, which has a more
progressive pension structure (Figure 14.6C).
Older peoples’ standards of living depend on a number of factors. For
example, homeownership can result in lower reported rates of poverty if
rent is imputed in the calculation of income. The level of homeownership
is slightly higher in Australia than the US, with 84 percent of people age
65 and over owning their homes, compared to 81 percent in the US
(Figure 14.7A). The average older Australian has a greater reliance on
capital income (which includes private pensions) than is true for older
Americans, who source more of their household income from work
(Figure 14.7B). In recent history, the US has had much higher mature age
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labor force participation rates than Australia. Nevertheless, the participation
rate in Australia has been increasing at a faster rate than is the case in the
US, in part due to increases in the pension access age for Australian women.
Australian men between ages 55 and 64 now have higher participation rates
than their American equivalents (Figure 14.7C).
A ﬁnal comparison relates to public expenditure on old age pensions.
The cost of age-related public pensions as a proportion of GDP is consider-
ably lower in Australia than the US—3.6 percent versus 4.8 percent of
GDP. Ofﬁcial projections from the US Congressional Budget Ofﬁce and
the Australian Treasury suggest that as population aging affects both coun-
tries and spending increases, these relative differences will remain. By 2050,
ﬁscal spending is expected to reach 4.9 percent of GDP in Australia and
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6 percent in the US (Figure 14.8). Much of this difference in public spend-
ing comes back to the structural differences between the two retirement
income systems. That is, Australia’s age pension scheme is much larger and
more important than SSI in the US but more modest than US Social
Security, while Australia’s second pillar is run as a funded DC scheme
independent of government.12
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Means-Testing and Incentives13
Retirement income transfers have the potential to distort incentives at two
different points: when tax to fund the transfer is levied and when the
transfer itself is received. Both need to be considered when analyzing the
economic efﬁciency of tax-funded transfers.14 In addition to evaluating
effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) of those being taxed to ﬁnance trans-
fers and those eligible to receive them, a complete analysis must include
dynamic inter-temporal effects. That is, the promise of transfers in retire-
ment can affect labor supply and savings decisions in working life. Greater
entitlement to retirement income, whether or not it is targeted, will have an
impact on labor supply and savings rates since the same standard of living
can be maintained with less work and saving.
So how can an analysis of effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) help with
understanding the incentive effects of targeted retirement income trans-
fers? The most commonly cited examples are the large EMTRs affecting
those on the margin of eligibility. For example, the ﬁnancial incentives
created by the retirement income system and related to EMTRs have been
shown empirically to have an effect on labor force participation and retire-
ment decisions (Gruber and Wise 1999). Since efﬁciency costs increase
disproportionately with EMTRs, their assessment is an obvious focus for
analysis. But EMTRs need to be balanced against other related explicit
taxes in the economy.
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To understand the trade-offs between EMTRs, the proportion of the
population affected, and other explicit taxes, it is instructive to compare a
universal social pension with one that is targeted. The targeted pension will
result in high EMTRs for those on the margin of eligibility whose pension is
withdrawn but will not affect the wider population in the way that a universal
pension will. The proportion of the population that is on the margin of
eligibility and the level of their EMTR will depend on the level of beneﬁt, the
scope of resources being means-tested, and importantly, the taper rate at
which the pension is withdrawn. For example, lower taper rates will mean
that a greater proportion of the population is affected but their EMTRs will
be lower.15 Yet having lower taper rates (and EMTRs), or zero taper rates in
the case of a universal pension, means that the cost of the program and the
resulting revenue requirement requires higher tax rates in the rest of the
economy. If the tax burden falls on workers who already pay high taxes, then
the lower EMTR for those receiving transfers may be outweighed by high
marginal tax rates on employment. Efﬁciency will therefore depend on an
appropriate trade-off between EMTRs of targeted schemes and the tax
burden of alternative programs.
Over recent decades, the analysis of means testing has received a boost
from new analytical literature on optimal taxation. Since the 1980s, the
received wisdom has been that it is inefﬁcient to tax capital since it distorts
saving and investment decisions (e.g. see Judd 1985). But more recently this
outcome has been challenged. In particular, the advantages of leaving
capital income untaxed may not materialize if markets are incomplete or
there are liquidity constraints; for example, losses from taxing capital must
be weighed against the losses suffered by constrained individuals from
taxing labor instead of capital.
Erosa and Gervais (2002) show that it may be optimal to impose a positive
tax on capital income. This is because an individual’s optimal consumption-
work plan can vary over the life cycle, and governments pursuing economic
efﬁciency as a goal would therefore want to make use of age-based consump-
tion and labor income tax rates. If these are not available, then capital taxes
may be efﬁcient. In a well-known paper, Conesa et al. (2009) use an OLG
model to estimate optimal capital and labor income tax rates in the US. The
model assumes that individuals face permanent productivity differences and
uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks, which the authors conclude leads
to an optimal capital income tax rate of 36 percent. Since true age-based
consumption and labor income tax rates are politically impractical, the
positive capital income tax rate acts as a second-best solution.
In the present context, however, the most important implication of this
research is that means-testing now can be rationalized on economic efﬁ-
ciency grounds. That is, a retirement income transfer with a means test on
capital income or assets can act as a tax on capital. In fact, such a means test
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/12/2015, SPi
288 Reimagining Pensions
is better targeted than a standard capital income tax since it is effectively an
age-based tax, directly addressing the complementarity between retirement
saving and retirement leisure.
So far as we are aware, no country has drawn on the age-based tax
literature (e.g. Alvarez et al. 1992; Erosa and Gervais 2002) to inform the
construction of means test withdrawal rates. Indeed, there are variations of
taper that could be investigated, including rates that depend on the value of
assets and age of beneﬁt recipients. The literature itself is deﬁcient in this
ﬁeld. To take just one example, to the authors’ knowledge, no study has
investigated economic effects of non-linear taper rates.
Some research suggests that economic efﬁciency is better served by with-
drawal rates which are quite signiﬁcant. An early study by Sefton et al.
(2008), focused on the UK pension system, suggested a ‘desirable’ with-
drawal rate of about 40 percent. Kumru and Piggott (2010), using an
overlapping generations model incorporating liquidity constraints and sto-
chastic wages, found efﬁciency improvements from even higher taper rates.
These ﬁndings contrast with the partial equilibrium analysis of high taper
rates examined in isolation from interactions with the economy as a whole
and its taxation system, which typically suggest that lower taper rates are
welfare-improving. Hence the research agenda is lengthy.
Compulsory Participation?
Mandatory retirement saving can be justiﬁed by appeal to economic efﬁ-
ciency on two grounds. First, if retirement transfers are to be provided to less
well-off households in retirement, then some form of mandatory saving will
offset free-riding behavior induced by the transfer (Hayek 1960). Second,
there is much evidence that people under-save for retirement, relative to
what would be predicted by a standard life cycle model as optimal. Behav-
ioral economics and ﬁnance attribute departures from this benchmark not
only to lack of competence, but to inertia, confusion, short-termism, and
lack of self-control (Mitchell and Utkus 2003). In such circumstances, man-
dating contributions can be seen as efﬁciency-improving.16 Mandatory con-
tributions were successfully implemented in Australia in part because no
mandatory contributory pension plan had been previously in place. Where a
contributory earnings-related social security system already operates, man-
dating savings is a more problematic option.
In many countries, enrollment in an earnings-related pension offered by
an employer is not mandatory, which affects coverage. An international
comparison of private pension coverage shows that countries with voluntary
enrollment into private pensions have consistently lower levels of participa-
tion (Figure 14.9A).
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In place of mandating savings, policymakers are increasingly seeking to
use inertia and procrastination by developing defaults related to enrollment
and other choice parameters. Some countries such as New Zealand have
found success in auto-enrollment, where a new employee is automatically
enrolled to contribute to a private pension unless they actively opt out. In
the UK, auto-enrollment for occupational pensions was proposed in 2008
and recently implemented. Johnson et al. (2010) submitted a further series
of recommendations aimed at making auto-enrollment work in the UK,
including changes to eligibility thresholds, portability, and ﬂexibility around
re-enrollment. There have also been recent calls in the UK to introduce
auto-escalation policies, where the rate of contribution increases over time
or is contingent on a future pay rise.
Some employers in the US are also beginning to use such strategies
(Figure 14.9B). These have been shown to work well in the US setting.
Madrian and Shea (2001) found that 401(k) enrollment was signiﬁcantly
higher under auto-enrollment and that defaults related to contribution
rates and investment mix had a substantial inﬂuence on changing saving
patterns.
Defaults in Australia focus on fund and portfolio choice. A 2010 review of
the Superannuation Guarantee recommended that each fund develop a
default investment portfolio (Cooper 2010). This recommendation was
made in the context of compulsory enrollment for all employees, and a
minimum contribution as a percentage of wages.
Table 14.1 shows how a range of countries position policy with regard to
choice, within a context where membership of a DC plan is either manda-
tory or effectively so. Minimum contributions are therefore also mandatory.
However, there is considerable variation in the extent of suggestion and
persuasion with regard to fund allocation, choice of provider, and beneﬁt.
Interestingly, none of these countries promotes taking advice through
default settings.
Defaults are now seen as a policy instrument. But because individual
circumstances vary so much, standard defaults can be crude and sometimes
miscalibrated. In principle, the Australian model allows defaults to be
determined on an individual basis, taking wealth, salary, age, and other
information held by the pension fund into account, although in practice
only age is taken into account within a fund’s default settings. Auto-
enrollment, auto-investment, auto-escalation of contributions, and auto-
annuitization, are all possible settings that should be considered when
designing and evaluating a well-structured DC pension plan. For the pri-
vate sector, these are also important human resource management strat-
egies (Mercer 2013).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/12/2015, SPi
The Australian Retirement Income System 291
table 14.1 Choice in deﬁned contribution schemes in OECD countries, 2013
No soft or hard
compulsiona
Default Tax preference
only
Mandated/highly
restricted choice
Enrollment AUS, CHI, DNK (ATP),
DNK (OCCUP), EST,
ISR, MEX, NOR,j POL,
SVK, SWE (PPM)
Contribution AUS, CHI, DNK
(ATP), DNK (OCCUP),
EST, ISR, MEX, NOR,
POL, SVK, SWE (PPM)
Allocation SVK AUS, CHI, DNK
(Occup.),e MEX,
EST, NOR, SWE
(PPM)
DNK (ATP), ISR, POL
Provider CHI, EST, SVK AUS, POL, MEX,
ISR
DNK (ATP), DNK
(Occup.), NOR, SWE
(PPM)
Advice AUS, CHI, DNK
(ATP),
DNK (OCCUP),
EST, ISR, MEX,
NOR1, POL,
SVK, SWE
(PPM)
Retirement
phaseb
CHI,c MEXh AUSd, DNK (ATP), DNK
(OCCUP), EST, ISR,
NOR, POL, SVK, SWE
(PPM)
Beneﬁt AUS, MEX,i
SVKk
DNK (Occup.)e DNK (ATP), CHIl EST,f
ISR,g NOR,f POL, SWE
(PPM)
Notes: [a] Only actuarial adjustment. [b] For retirement decisions, the existence of a minimum
age represents a mandated choice. [c] Requires a DC beneﬁt of at least 80% of the maximum
targeted beneﬁt and a replacement rate of at least 70%. [d] Tax incentive to delay until 60 until
2024, then mandated to no earlier than 60. [e] Choice with respect to allocation and beneﬁt can
differ by scheme and is decided when ﬁrst becoming a member, but annuities are often the
default option. [f] Choice among types of annuities. [g] Once annuity is purchased up to a
certain level, left over funds can be taken as lump sum. [h] Members may retire at any age if the
accumulated capital in their account allows them to buy an annuity that is at least 30% higher
than the minimum guaranteed pension. In this case, the member does not have to complete the
1,250 weeks of contributions. [i] Choice is between phased withdrawal or annuity. Lump sums
can be taken only if 1,250 weeks of contributions is not reached. [j] Employermust pay minimum
contribution; employee may contribute but does not have to. [k] Annuity or phased withdrawal.
No lump sum. [l] Chile allows restricted choice of phased withdrawal, price indexed life annuity
or a combination of withdrawals and immediate or deferred annuity, while lump sums are
allowed for funds beyond those required to provide a speciﬁed level of pension.
Source : Authors’ compilation of various sources.
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Public Employee Pensions
For a substantial minority of Australian workers, the Superannuation Guar-
antee had no immediate consequence, because they were already members
of a public employee pension plan. In the US, solvency issues have become
critical in many state plans and a source of ﬁscal stress at the state level
(Novy-Marx and Rauh 2012). In some countries, particularly emerging
economies such as India and China, rapidly aging populations have exacer-
bated the issue of ﬁnancing civil service pensions, which are sometimes seen
as a source of ﬁscal stress on their own.
Public sector pensions in Australia are unusual: currently all new mem-
bers of public sector schemes (except the judiciary and the military) are
enrolled in DC plans. While many countries still offer ﬁnal salary schemes to
public sector workers, over the past 20 years Australia has transitioned these
from unfunded or partially funded DB to fully funded DC schemes. Admit-
tedly, legacy costs are large, totaling about 15 percent of GDP. However,
projections see these declining over time (Bateman and Piggott 2011b).
A recent comparison of Australian and US sub-sovereign pension credit
risk commends the switch of Australian states and territories to the more
predictable and less risky DC plans (Moody’s 2013). Australia also adopted
more conservative discount rate assumptions tied to government bond rates.
Such policies have contributed to the fact that, according to Moody’s, all
Australian states (and the Northern Territory) have the highest available
credit ratings of AAA or AA1, compared to only 29, or 60 percent, of US
states.
Bateman and Piggott (2011a) argue that the introduction of the Super-
annuation Guarantee in the private sector provided the impetus for reform
of public sector pensions. It is part of a long-term trend of private and public
sector workers becoming subject to similar policies: as the framework for
Superannuation Guarantee developed, it was natural that workers from
both sectors were subject to it.
The main remaining challenge for public sector superannuation funds in
Australia is dealing with the unfunded liabilities of the now closed pay-
as-you-go schemes across the Commonwealth, State, and Territory govern-
ments (Bateman and Piggott 2011a). This challenge is being addressed via
legislation stipulating regular contributions that will see a gradual fall in
unfunded liabilities. In addition, speciﬁc funds have been established to
ﬁnance future liabilities that will come due at a time period when popula-
tion aging is likely to place signiﬁcant pressure on government budgets. For
example, the Commonwealth government established the Future Fund in
early 2006. Sometimes referred to as Australia’s ‘sovereign wealth fund,’ the
Future Fund is expressly devoted to ﬁnancing previously unfunded super-
annuation liabilities of Commonwealth government employees (including
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defense personnel). The arm’s-length Future Fund was started with contri-
butions from budget surpluses as well as large asset sales, particularly the sale
of the previously government-owned telecommunication company, Telstra.
Conclusion
This chapter has outlined Australia’s somewhat idiosyncratic system of
retirement provision, with its means-tested, ﬂat-rate age pension along
with mandatory, pre-funded income replacement. We have also related
that structure to the US experience. We speculate that some limited
means testing of Social Security might be possible, reducing the system’s
unfunded liabilities. Although the structure is unusual, Australia is not alone
in having a means-tested social pension at the heart of its retirement
structure—Denmark is another. Canada moved some distance toward this
structure by legislating a tax claw-back of its basic pension, payable by the
afﬂuent; this is a possible implementation mechanism which would leave
social security entitlements intact.
Mandatory pre-funded pension contributions seem a more difﬁcult
reform to implement in an environment which already delivers graduated
Social Security beneﬁts. Defaults appear to be expanding 401(k) plan
membership in the US. It may be possible to contemplate an initiative
such as the UK’s by mandating auto-enrollment, at some acceptable contri-
bution rate. Changes in private sector pension provision may make reforms
of public sector pensions more palatable.
Endnotes
1. In practice age pension payments are counted in assessable income but the senior
and pensioners tax offset means that it is effectively tax-free.
2. The idea of ‘three pillars’ originated in the seminal World Bank publication,
‘Averting the Old Age Crisis’ (World Bank 1994), and has also been used in
OECD analysis (e.g. OECD 2013).
3. It may only be available subject to a means test, since its function is to ensure the
elderly are adequately provided for.
4. The discussion of Australia’s retirement income system draws on Bateman and
Piggott (2011a) and Bateman (2011).
5. An age service pension is available to veterans. It is paid on the grounds of age or
invalidity, and to eligible partners, widows, and widowers. Beneﬁt level is the same
as the age pension and the means test also applies. The access age is 60.
6. Recipients of the age pension also gain access to other beneﬁts such as subsidized
medication and assistance with rent.
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7. Announcements made in the 2014 Australian government budget foreshadow a
future change in indexation of beneﬁts to prices only. This would undermine the
relative importance of the age pension in Australia. Projections presented in this
chapter assume the age pension retains its long-term value relative to wages.
8. Age pension access age for women increased from 60 to age 65 by 2014. Subse-
quent increases to age 67 will apply to both males and females. Announcements
made in the 2014 Australian government budget foreshadow a future rise in the
pension access age to 70.
9. The Superannuation Guarantee has not yet fully matured—the initial 9 percent
contribution target was phased in, and applied from 2002.
10. See Bateman and Piggott (1997, 1998) for a detailed discussion of the historical
evolution of the Australian system.
11. A poverty line at 40 percent of population-wide median income approximates
the relevant poverty threshold used by the US government while allowing for
comparability across countries. In 2010, the ofﬁcial US poverty thresholds for
households with one and two older people were 36 percent and 45 percent of
median (unequivalized) income, respectively (authors’ calculations based on
OECD 2014 and US census data).
12. Note that the comparison of expenditure does not include tax expenditures. In
both cases spending on disability pensions is included.
13. This material draws heavily on Piggott et al. (2009).
14. For a discussion of links between redistribution and incentives see Robalino et al.
(2007).
15. This point was ﬁrst made by Blinder and Rosen (1985). Sefton et al. (2008)
makes the same point in the context of means-tested pensions in the UK.
16. While Strotz (1956) did not explicitly mention retirement saving, he understood
clearly the role of commitment devices: ‘We are often willing even to pay a price
to pre-commit future actions (and to avoid temptation).’
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